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NOTES ON ROMAN JUSTICE AND EQUITY
In its strict sense, justice is “the virtue whereby a man renders to 
everyone his due.” The opening words of the Institutes of Justin ian  give 
U lpian’s definition of justice—Justitia  est constans et perpetua voluntas 
jus suum unicuique tribuendi,—Justice is the constant and perpetual in ten­
tion to render everyone his due. Justitia  then is the virtue of the hum an 
will which inclines man to act justly, to follow what justice prescribes. 
This definition of justitia then is borrowed from Ulpian. “The juris prae- 
cepta are there: to live honestly, to injure no one, to give everyone his 
due.”
Justice properly so-called is had when one's due is to be rendered 
him in full measure, no more or less, or according to the rigor or stric t­
ness of law, namely, it corresponds with the precepts of law strictly in ter­
preted. On the other hand there would be justice in a broad sense, if 
the thing due m ust be given because of some other virtue, e.g., religion, 
decency, fealty or equity. Justice then in this extensive sense differs 
little from “virtue’ namely, goodness, honesty, rectitude, righteousness: for 
it includes within itself the whole circle of virtues. Thus we read in the 
Old Testam ent: “Abram believed God, and it was reputed to him unto 
justice.” There is justice in the broad sense when an employer doubles 
the wage of his employee from affection or munificence. Such justice 
also has a place in determining the salary of workmen where a twofold 
intrinsic value is to be considered. There are the hum ane-m oral and the 
economical-material aspects of labour; and so the personal wage with the 
family wage or, as it is called, “the living wage” is alone to be consid­
ered the minimum just wage.
This broader acceptation of justice is what we call natural justice 
as compared to or distinguished from legal justice: for while the latter 
signifies stric t conformity with the precepts of hum an laws, the former 
denotes conformity with the natural law, requires the practice of other 
virtues besides th a t of justice, all of which must be mutually combined 
and made to harmonize; for the various virtues, far from running counter 
to one another, are fundamentally in accord, since all virtues come from 
God, the highest Good. Accordingly, we have the significant statem ent 
of Paulus, the Roman jurist: Not everything th a t is permitted by law is 
morally right; so too the 90th of the 211 Regulae juris, with which the 
Roman Digest ends, declares: “In all things, but especially in law, equity 
is to be regarded.” Celsus, author of an early encyclopedic work on 
jurisprudence, with elegance and acumen defined jus as ars boni et aequi, 
the a rt of all th a t is good and equitable, and adds th a t for this reason 
a jurist is a sort of m inister or priest. This art, ars boni aequi, ought 
to consist in a correction of the stric t letter of law th a t works an  injury, 
or when a positive hum an law is not in harmony with the principles of 
natural justice, or again when it is in itself so deficient th a t what is 
legally righ t becomes morally wrong. Seneca rightly observed: “How 
small a sphere is the domain of law in comparison with th a t of obliga­
tion! How numerous are the obligations of affection, hum anity, liberality, 
justice and fealty, all of which are found outside the written law.” Aris­
totle, in Ethica Nichamachea V-10 therefore promptly calls equity the cor­
rection of sta tu te  or w ritten law. Summum jus est summa injuria,— 
very frequently the full measure of the law is the full measure of injus-
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ti.ce. Accordingly, they who always insist upon the full measure of their 
legal rights and take legal proceedings to obtain the same when such 
rights work injury to others are to be roundly condemned. Hence Gaius 
says. " It often happens th a t a person is bound according to the civil 
law. yet it is unjust th a t he should be condemned.” and Paulus declares: 
“ . . . . this pertains to equity, with regard to which pernicious errors 
are frequently made under the authority of the science of law.”
Persecutors often appeal to written laws, as did the Roman emperors 
in their attacks upon the Christians. But from the natural law itself 
their injustice was patent. Even in our day in certain places persecutors 
defend their inquity by appealing to the written law. But it is absolutely 
cruel to assert freedom and the authority of law in those circumstances 
when what are called laws are actually the reverse of law and as such 
offend natural justice. It is not justice th a t is wrought by laws, but laws 
themselves should be formulated according to justice. Justice should not 
be measured by laws, but laws themselves should be adapted to justice 
and right.
LUMLEY v. WAGNER
Lumley v. Wagner is a case where, there being an executory contract 
in part positive and in part ntgative, the positive part being such as the 
Court is unable to enforce spec fically, but will interfere in respect of the 
negative part by means of an injunction. Here the defendant entered 
into a contract with the plaintiff to sing a t his theatre, and not to sing 
a t any other; and Lord St. Leon a*d granted an injunction restraining the 
defendant from singing a t any other theatre than  the plaintiff’s, though 
the specific performance of the positive part would have certainly been 
beyond the Court’s power.
A contract of hire and service is not one of those contracts of which 
the Court will decree specific performance. You cannot directly compel 
me to serve you. Can you do so indirectly by obtaining an injunction to 
prevent me from breaking th a t negative but unexpressed term  in the con­
trac t th a t I am not to enter the service of anybody else? No, you can not. 
This seems well settled, th a t a merely implied negative term  in a contract 
which is substantially positive can not be enforced by injunction. In  
Whitwood Chemical Co. v. H ardnan (1891) 2 Ch. 416, Lindley L. J . said 
th a t he looked upon Lumley v. Wagner as an anomaly not to be extended. 
In  tha t case the m anager of a m anufacturing company had agreed th a t 
during a specified term  he would give all his time to the business. I t  
was held by the Court of Appeal th a t the company could have an in junc­
tion to prevent him giving part of his time to a rival company.
We seem to arrive a t this principle: th a t you can not indirectly by 
means of an injunction enforce the specific performance of an agreement 
which is of such a kind th a t specific performance of it would not be direct­
ly decreed: but if you can separate from this positive agreement an express 
negative agreement th a t the defendant will not do certain specific things, 
then you may have an injunction to restrain  a breach of th a t negative 
agreement.
Accordingly, Fry on Specific Performance a t page 402 states: “ the 
position of th a t branch of the law on which Lumley v. W agner is the 
leading authority can hardly be said to be very satisfactory. I t  may, 
it is conceived, be concluded th a t the principle of this case will not be 
extended: th a t negative stipulations will not be implied except in  cases
